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KENTUCKY LAW JOUiiNAL
CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES AND DISPOSITION OF
OFFENDERS
I. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES
A. Introduction
Prior to the adoption of the Kentucky Penal Code by the 1972
General Assembly, the Commonwealth classified crimes as either
felonies or misdemeanors. Felonies were defined simply as those
offenses punishable by death or confinement in the penitentiary with
all other offenses, whether common law or statutory, deemed mis-
demeanors.' This lack of substantive differentiation often resulted in
"disparate sentencing for offenders engaged in substantially identical
conduct."2
The only limitation on the imposition of penalties was included in
the definition of each statutory offense.3 If convicted of a common law
offense where no penalty was provided by statute, the offender could
be "imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to exceed 12 months
or fined a sum not to exceed $5,000 or both."4 This language also
served to fill the void created by statutes which defined offenses with-
out specifying parameters to aid the jury or court in sentencing.
The Kentucky Penal Code, in an attempt to implement a rational
sentencing structure capable of uniform application, has developed
a four-degree system for felonies and a three-degree system for mis-
demeanors.5 This represents a compromise between the original
three-felony system of the Model Penal Code and the five-felony system
adopted by New York. The three-felony system fails to adequately
provide necessary distinctions between offenses, 6 while the five-felony
system requires unrealistic distinctions.7 Misdemeanors, classified in
a three-tier system which recognizes degrees of minor offenses, carry
a maximum sentence of 12 months imprisonment. "Violations," a
category of offenses under misdemeanors, seeks to control non-criminal
conduct such as public drunkenness and loitering that is merely
offensive. The classification approach improves significantly upon
prior law by focusing on the seriousness of the crime rather than
1 Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.060 (1969) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 KENTucKy LEGISLAVE RESEARCH CoMIMIsIoN, KENTUCKY PIENAL CODE §
3405, Commentary (Final Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as LRCI.
3 KRS § 431.070. (1) No crime shall be punished with death unless directed
by statute. (2) A common law offense for which punishment is prescribed by
statute, shall be punished only in the mode so prescribed.
4 KRS § 431.075.
5 Ky. Acrs ch. 385, 261 (1972) [chapter 385 is hereinafter cited as KYPC].
PNoposED Ky. REv. STAT. § 435A.1-010 [hereinafter cited as [KRS]].
6 LRC § 3405, Commentary.
7 LRC § 3405, Commentary.
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upon the character or circumstances of the offender and reduces the
influence of jury bias by imposing sentencing guidelines.
B. Sentencing Philosophy
The new Penal Code recognizes implicitly that punishment is
necessary for the offender and for society. Society must be protected
and offenders must be punished in a manner rationally calculated to
achieve proper ends. An enlightened approach to punishment allows
individualization of justice while incidentally demonstrating that others
will suffer for a similar breach of the law. Kentucky's Penal Code is
clearly oriented toward rehabilitation whereas under prior law it was
impossible to ascertain any dominant goal of sentencing.
The four goals implicit in sentencing offenders to imprisonment
are: (1) deterrence, (2) neutralization, (3) rehabilitation, and (4) ret-
ribution. Deterrence is divided into two classes: special and general.
Special deterrence seeks to prevent the specific offender from repeating
the proscribed act while general deterrence operates to restrain the
populace from criminal acts by publicizing successful prosecutions.
Neutralization recognizes that incapacitation and removal from society
eliminates repetition of crimes by the offender during imprisonment.
Rehabilitation involves treatment during confinement designed to
prevent recurrent violations and to return the individual to society as
a useful member. Retribution demands that the offender demonstrate
an understanding of his wrongful conduct to society. The implementa-
tion of these goals involves a weighing process to determine which
concept should have relative priority in the sentencing scheme and to
determine whether judge, jury or parole board should be responsible
for effectuating the chosen policies.
C. The Law Prior to Kentucky's 1972 Penal Code
Kentucky was previously one of thirteen jurisdictions where the
maximum period of imprisonment was determined by the jury within
statutory limits. However, the trial judge retained a potentially
prominent role due to his power of probation over the convicted
offender, which permitted an alternative to imprisonment subject to
judicially imposed conditions." The offender's failure to conform to
probation conditions9 could result in the judicial imposition of any
sentence which the jury originally has power to mete out.'0
If the trial judge did not grant probation or if it was granted and
subsequently revoked, the Department of Corrections assumed control
8 KRS § 439.260(1).




over the offender for a period not to exceed the maximum sentence
set by the jury. The Parole Board ultimately decided whether he was
to be paroled prior to serving the full sentence.:" The only guideline
for the exercise of the Parole Board's discretion was its promulgation
of a schedule for parole eligibility.1.2 The prisoner was interviewed by
the Board and a hearing was conducted after which parole could be
denied, recommended with stipulation, or deferred for later review.
"In Kentucky we have had an indeterminate sentence with a
maximum term fixed by the jury and no minimum term."'3 Therefore,
a convicted offender could not be forced to serve a sentence exceeding
that originally set by the jury. This was true even where the offender
had been probated or paroled with a subsequent violation of probation
or parole conditions causing him to be recommitted to prison. The
concept of "no minimum term" meant that once a prisoner was
incarcerated the Parole Board could grant parole immediately. Pre-
Code law therefore sought to wrest complete control over the dis-
position of the offender from the jury by guaranteeing that the trial
judge and/or Parole Board share in the decision-making. Despite
criticism that jurors may lack appropriate training and education, the
jury was believed essential because it assured a defendant that the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence would be equitably decided by
the collective common sense of twelve of his peers.
In 1969, following an evaluation of Kentucky's criminal law by the
Kentucky Law Journal,14 it was suggested that the Parole Board be
given responsibility for determining the maximum time to be served
by an offender, historically a jury function. It was thought that the
jury often failed to set sentences of sufficient duration to ensure suc-
cessful rehabilitation. Further, the shift of responsibility from jury to
Parole Board would benefit the offender by allowing his initial sentence
to be determined with reference to a complete presentence report
encompassing valuable psychological and psychiatric data. Imple-
mentation of this procedure would have resulted in a sentence de-
signed to maximize the opportunity for rehabilitation; however, the
General Assembly rejected the change and the jury currently continues
to establish maximum terms for offenders.
D. Kentucky's New Penal Code
By separating offenses into degrees, the new Penal Code provides
11 KRS § 439.340.
12 Kentucky Parole Board Regulation DC-Rg-6 (1966).
13 LRC § 3430, Commentary.
14 Student Criminal Law Symposium, 57 Ky. L.J. 454 (1969).
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great improvement in Kentucky's criminal law. Penalties for felony
offenses under prior law had no ascertainable basis. Without the
benefit of degrees of offenses, judges and prosecutors were forced to
make distinctions in individual cases based upon mitigating circum-
stances; an elusive approach that often produced inconsistent results.
To achieve consistency in the application of penalties the Kentucky
Crime Commission analyzed and compared the severity of each crime
with its respective punishment. During deliberation on the enactment
of the Kentucky Code the General Assembly further evaluated all
recognized offenses. A prime result of this intensive review should be
a reduction in needless and costly prosecutions by more accurately
defining criminal conduct.
Section 261 of the Kentucky Penal Code [KRS § 435A.1-010]
establishes four classes of felonies: A, B, C, and D. The sanctions
imposed for commission of crimes within these respective categories
are twenty years to life imprisonment, ten to twenty years, five to ten
years, and one to five years. The maximum sanction at each level
beginning with "A" and ending at "D" decreases in severity with one
year of imprisonment as the minimum sentence for commission of a
felonious offense.' 5 Any crime which specifies a sentence of months,
even if twelve months, constitutes a misdemeanor under the new
Code. Misdemeanors are classified as "A," "B," or "violations." The
maximum sanction for "A" misdemeanors is imprisonment in a local
institution for a period not to exceed twelve months while a "B" mis-
demeanor provides a definite term of imprisonment not to exceed
ninety days.' The Code provides two classes of misdemeanor offenses
because there is a recognized need for greater restriction on sentencing
power where definite terms of imprisonment are involved. While local
penal institutions cannot individualize punishment or treatment for
these offenders, the drafters felt that exposure to incarceration would
provide the necessary deterrence to prevent misdemeanants from becom-
ing felons. "Violations" include those offenses for which the offender
may be sentenced to pay a fine. The rationale is special and general
deterrence but, since "violations" usually involve no risk of physical
harm to others, there is little reason to impose a jail sentence upon
the violator.
The Code's classification system is based upon the following factors:
(1) the harm actually resulting from a criminal act, (2) the risk of
harm caused by the actor, and (3) the degree of temptation faced
15 LRC § 3430, Commentary.
16 KYPC § 268 [KRS § 435A.1-0901.
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by the actor.17 Moral fault, sometimes considered a fourth factor
for measuring culpability, is used by the judge or jury in fixing a
particular sentence within discretionary limits.18 The jury continues
to determine the maximum sentence for all offenders within boundaries
imposed by the classification system. On the other hand, the trial judge
plays an expanded role under the new law which grants him the right
to modify the jury's sentence within certain limits.19
Generally, the judge may never reduce the maximum length of an
indeterminate sentence below the minimum established by the Code
for the category into which that offense falls. For example, if a jury
sentences an offender to life imprisonment for the commission of an
"A" felony, the judge may not reduce the sentence below the twenty
year minimum for class "A" felonies. The rationale for creating this
"middle alternative" is based on the unsatisfactory alternatives formerly
available to the judge of either granting probation or imposing the
jury's sentence. However, in the case of a class "D" felony the trial
judge may commit the offender to a "local institution for a definite term
of imprisonment not to exceed one year."20 This provision allows
individualization of justice in special situations such as that of the
young offender whose past record is such that neither probation nor
confinement in the state penitentiary is entirely suitable. The probation
alternative may not be sufficiently severe, especially where the offender
has violated previous conditions of probation. On the other hand,
the state penitentiary experience is often too harsh given the young
offender's vulnerability as a target for sexual abuse and counter-
productive to the goals of sentencing in that he will be exposed to
more sophisticated techniques and levels of crime.
II. THE DEATH PENALTY AND LiEm WrrmouT PRIVILEGE OF PAROLE
The death penalty can be traced to ancient times. The ancient
edict of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" embodied in the
Code of Hammurabi is cited by modern proponents to justify imposing
death sentences for heinous crimes. With equal vehemence the
opponents of the death penalty cite Biblical passages to support their
position and condemn it as an unenlightened solution for dealing with
criminal offenders.
Capital punishment came to America from Europe but was
tempered considerably in the process. "In early sixteenth century
17 See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HAuv. L. Rlv. 635, 636 (1966).
Is ld.
19 KYPC § 266(1) [KRS § 435A.1-070(1)].
20
KYPC § 266(2) [KRS § 435A.1-070(2)].
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England there were eight major capital crimes. By 1688 there were
nearly fifty and as late as 1819 one could be put to death for any of
223 capital crimes." 21 These included offenses against the state, per-
sons, property, and the public peace. The mode of execution ranged
from hanging to the inhuman torture of drawing, hanging, disem-
boweling, and beheading, followed by quartering. 22 Early English
capital crimes were all considered felonies with mandatory death
penalties and the convicted person could escape death only by inter-
cession of the Crown. Frequently, those who thus avoided execution
were punished by banishment to the colonies to begin a desolate new
life. The seeming severity of English law was mild, however, com-
pared to the criminal codes of other European nations during the
same period.
America's first capital statutes date to 1636 when the Massachusetts
Bay Colony listed thirteen capital offenses under the title of "The
Capitall Lawes of New-England." 3 By the War of Independence
most colonies had comparable statutes with nine offenses and death
by hanging. In 1794, Dr. Benjamin Rush, the father of the movement
to abolish capital punishment in the United States, along with Benjamin
Franklin and Pennsylvania Attorney General William Bradford, led the
crusade which resulted in that state's repeal of the death penalty for
all crimes except "first degree" murder. The 1830's witnessed strong
abolitionist movements in several states although no more than one-
fourth of the states have ever abolished the death penalty at any one
time. The result of partially successful abolition movements includes
reduction of the number of capital crimes, replacement of mandatory
death sentences with jury discretion to grant imprisonment, develop-
ment of more humane methods of conducting executions, and the
elimination of public executions. However, the number and variety of
capital statutes evidence belief that the death penalty is still an effective
deterrent and appropriate punishment.
Supreme Court decisions reflect judicial recognition that capital
punishment is an area of divergent opinions. Each time the Court
considers the constitutionality of the death penalty or various modes
of execution, the justices look to prevailing social attitudes to help
them define and apply inherently dynamic legal concepts. A prime
example can be found in the eighth amendment language pro-
hibiting "cruel and unusual punishment."
2 1 l Bedau, Introduction to THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA at 1 (H.A. Bedau
ed. 1967).
22 4 W. BLAcxsoNE, CommETArAmEs *92.2 3 Haskins, The Capitall Lawes of New-England, 7 HARv. LAw ScHooL BuLL.
10, 10-11 (Feb. 1956).
KENUcKY LAw JouRNAL
The "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Bill of Rights
was not interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States until
almost a century after its enactment. The Court, in Wilkerson v.
Utah,24 upheld capital punishment for premeditated murder and execu-
tion by public shooting. Twelve years later, Chief Justice Fuller,
writing for a unanimous Court, said electrocution was a permissible
mode of imposing death.25 The Court found that New York's legisla-
ture intended to minimize pain for the executed, thereby establishing
a humane purpose in their selection of electrocution. However, this
early case held that the eighth amendment was inapplicable to the
states.
In O'Neil v. Vermont" the Court reaffirmed the inapplicability
of the eighth amendment to the states. The petitioner argued that a
$6,500 fine for 807 counts of selling liquor with a potential 54 years
imprisonment at hard labor for nonpayment violated the "cruel and
unusual punishment" clause. Although the Court upheld the convic-
tion, the minority would have protected individuals against all punish-
ments which by their excessive length or severity were greatly dis-
proportionate to the offenses charged, with Justice Field noting "the
whole inhibition is against that which is excessive... ."27 The minority
asserted that the nature of the crime, the purpose of the law, and the
length of sentence imposed should be adopted as factors to be con-
sidered in deciding whether the eighth amendments "cruel and un-
usual punishment" clause is violated in future cases.
Eighteen years after O'Neil the Supreme Court for the first time
invalidated a penalty prescribed by a state legislature.28 In Weems V.
United States the petitioner was convicted of falsifying public docu-
ments and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor in
ankle chains, loss of civil rights, and perpetual surveillance. Indi-
cating that the Constitution was a progressive document whose
language is to be interpreted according to present and future rather
than past standards, the Court found this punishment excessive.29
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber"0 a condemned man sought
to prevent a second electrocution where, due to a mechanical failure,
the first attempt did not cause his death. Although now willing to
apply the eighth amendment to the states, the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
24 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
25 In re Kemraler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
26 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
27 Id. at 340.
28 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
29 Id. at 373.
30 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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nevertheless upheld the legislature's adoption of electrocution as a
humane method of execution in spite of the suffering in this particular
case. As in Weems, the Court used the O'Neil factor test to analyze
the "cruel and unusual punishment" question.
Judicial interpretation of the eighth amendment was further refined
in Trop v. Dulles,31 where the Supreme Court held that loss of citizen-
ship by reason of court-martial conviction for wartime desertion con-
stituted "cruel and unusual punishment." Chief Justice Warren noted
that the words "cruel and unusual" were flexible and "[t]he amend-
ment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."32 Involuntary stateless-
ness was deemed excessive punishment in relation to practices of other
civilized nations for similar offenses.
In 1962 the Court eliminated any lingering doubts by holding in
Robinson v. California3  that the states are bound by the eighth
amendment.3 4 This case found a Court majority willing to use the
eighth amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment'
to invalidate a 90 day sentence for a violator of the California "addiction
to the use of narcotics" statute. Justice Stewart writing for the Court
emphasized that the criteria for "cruel and unusual punishment" must
be continually re-examined "in the light of contemporary human
knowledge."35 The language in Trop as reiterated in Robinson suggests
that a penalty which was previously permissible is not necessarily
acceptable today based upon prevailing social standards. An analysis
of the preceeding cases reveals situations where punishment was
deemed excessive and violative of the eighth amendment; yet no mode
of execution was ever set aside as "cruel and unusual punishment."
The Court was never willing to even consider capital punishment per
se as violative of the convicted offender's eighth amendment rights.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois26 and McGautha v. California,37 the
Court confined its attention to procedural aspects of capital trials with
a majority in each instance refusing to hold that death could not be
constitutionally imposed. Avoiding the eighth amendment issue, the
Court refused to find constitutional dimensions in the argument that
those who exercise their discretion to send a person-to death should
be given standards by which to act.
31356 U.S. 86 (1958).
32 Id. at 101.
33 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
34 See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
35 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.. 660, 666 (1962).
36 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
37 402 U.S. 1883 (1971).
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The general pre-Code statutory death penalty provision in Kentucky
provided that "no crime shall be punished with death unless directed
by statute." 8 Under pre-Code law death was an alternate punishment
for twelve criminal offenses.
Kentucky's Proposed Penal Code § 3440, not enacted by the Gen-
eral Assembly, retained death as a possible sanction for one convicted
of an offense categorized as a Class "A" felony.39 Alternate sanctions
under this section included life imprisonment without privilege of
parole and an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. 40 Under §
3440, Class "A" felons must be provided bifurcated proceedings with a
determination of innocence or guilt in the first stage and, if the
defendant is found guilty, the imposition of sentence in the second
stage. Bifurcated trials are designed to allow maximum flexibility in
the rules governing admissibility of evidence pertinent to disposition
of these often dangerous offenders. For example, in a bifurcated pro-
ceeding the sentencing stage may feature introduction of the de-
fendant's prior criminal record and any other relevant evidence that
would possibly be prejudicial in a single stage trial. Now, "evidence
may be presented by either party on any matter relevant to sen-
tencing... -41 However, the jury must reach a unanimous agreement
before death or life without privilege of parole may be imposed and
failure to reach such an agreement is cause for a new jury to be
impaneled. The decision to impanel a new jury is solely within the
discretion of the trial judge; he may instead impose an indeterminate
sentence within limits set out in § 3440. This means that the judge's
sentence could not be less than the minimum or exceed the maximum
sanction established for a particular grade of offense. For instance,
one convicted of committing a Class "A" felony could receive a sentence
of 20 years to life from the judge. When an offender pleads guilty, the
judge impanels a jury which decides the sentence according to the
same rules embodied in the penalty stage of a contested case.4
Section 3440 represented an attempt to make the sentencing of
serious offenders a more rational procedure consistent with the classi-
fication system of criminal offenses. The format of § 3440 enables
individualization of justice based upon more data than is ever allowed
38 KRS § 431.070 (1).
39 LRC § 3440. The new Code authorizes death as a sanction for anyone
causing death or a serious physical injury in the course of an abortion, murder, or
rape of a child under 12 years of age; for sodomy; and for kidnapping unless the
defendant releases the victim alive, substantially unharmed, and in a safe place
prior to trial.4 0 LRC § 3440, Commentary.
41LRC 3440(3) (a).
42 LRC 1 3440(5).
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in traditional trial proceedings. Even though the Commentary ex-
presses skepticism as to the value of the death penalty as a deterrent,
it was retained as an alternate sanction with protection of society
as its rationale.
The drafters of § 3440 also realized that life imprisonment without
privilege of parole can be employed to protect society from dangerous
offenders without resorting to putting these men to death. This sanc-
tion recognizes a particular offender's inability to be rehabilitated and
become a useful member of society. Life without parole was recog-
nized under pre-Code law only for the rape of a female over twelve
years of age.43 This resulted in an anomalous situation because of the
incongruity between it and the penalty for rape of a child under
twelve,44 clearly a more heinous crime. In both instances a convicted
offender could receive the death penalty, but, if death was not imposed
in the case of rape of a female under 12, the felon was eligible for
parole after serving part of his life sentence. Despite the need for a
more enlightened process for imposing sanctions and the need to
remedy the above anomaly the 1972 General Assembly omitted § 3440
when enacting the Kentucky Penal Code. The omission demonstrates
a lack of understanding of the values of the provision. It is recom-
mended that the provision, absent the death penalty alternative, be
reconsidered for inclusion in the law before the bill's effective date of
July 1, 1974. Section 3440, a cornerstone of the Penal Code's scheme
of disposition of offenders, provides the flexibility required for ad-
ministering the criminal justice system in Kentucky. Its exclusion
leaves the Commonwealth with a progressive Penal Code made in-
complete by this legislative omission. This is especially true in light
of the revolutionary legal developments in 1972 following the General
Assembly's evaluation of the Kentucky Penal Code.
The legal revolution began in February, 1972, with the California
Supreme Court's decision in People v. Anderson.45 Influenced by the
fact that 104 men, among them Charles Manson and Sirhan Sirhan,
awaited execution on death row, the court felt that the constitutional
question of whether the death penalty violated the eighth amendment
could no longer be avoided or deferred to any other branch of gov-
ernment. By a 6-1 decision the court held capital punishment violative
of the eighth amendments "cruel and unusual punishment" clause.
While several arguments were advanced by the majority as rationale
43 KRS § 435.090.44 KRS § 435.080. This statute notes alternate sanctions of death or life
imprisonment with possibility of parole.
45493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
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for their holding, the California court was concerned primarily with
the fact that any execution which ultimately follows pronouncement
of the death sentence has in fact become "lingering death" for the
convicted. 46 Citing Weems, the court said the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause was "progressive, not being fastened to obsolete
standards and acquiring meaning as public opinion became enlightened
by a humane justice."47 Related to the "lingering death" concept, the
psychological impact of the punishment was characterized as "im-
pending" with the fear and distress that accompanies that state of
mind. The court also cited a world-wide trend toward abolition of
the death penalty noting that where the sanction is retained, applica-
tion is exceptional and frequently executive authority pardons the
condemned person.48 Finally, while indicating that offenders deserve
no sympathy, they also reasoned that society cannot be deemed en-
lightened if human life is taken for purposes of vengeance.
The Supreme Court of the United States assured the nation that
dispositive action on capital punishment would be taken during the
1972 term when it granted certiorari in Furman v. Georgia.49 The
petitioners were two black men sentenced to death-one for raping
a white woman, the other for murder. Also included in the case for
disposition was another black man convicted of raping a white
woman.50 Certiorari was granted for the following question: "Does
the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases]
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments?"51
Delaying until the final day of the 1972 term, the Supreme Court
handed down its long awaited decision.5 2 There had been a mora-
torium of executions in the United States since 1967 while various
cases worked their way through the appellate courts, and there were
over 600 convicts on death row throughout the country. The Supreme
Court, philosophically transformed by President Nixon's four ap-
pointees, was expected to uphold the death penalty's constitutionality.
However, by a 5-4 vote with all nine justices writing separate opinions,
they ruled that capital punishment as currently imposed is "cruel and
46 Id. at 892, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
47 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).4 8 See U.N. ECOSOC, Note by the Secretary General, Capital Punishment
3, U.N. Doc. E/4947 (1971).
49403 U.S. 952 (1971).
Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1969), cert. granted,
403 U.S. 952 (1971).51 Furman v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 952 (1971).5 2 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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unusual punishment" in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.
The ramifications of the holding in Furman are especially subject
to speculation because of the closeness of the vote in the face of an
ever changing Court whose four Nixon apointees voted as a block to
uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty. Therefore a brief
analysis of the individual opinions is necessary in order to evaluate
the impact of the decision with primary emphasis directed toward the
ultimate issue of whether the Supreme Court will ever again allow
the death penalty to be imposed. This is particularly important in
view of those opinions which hint that legislative reform of state
statutory language might make the death penalty constitutionally
permissible. The articulate and well-reasoned opinions in Furman
set out in the following analysis demonstrate the justices' divergent
legal philosophies.
Although the five majority justices reached their decisions through
different legal reasoning, their basic objection to the capital punish-
ment statutes was that present laws permit the death penalty to be
administered in a capricious, discriminatory manner. This is ironic
when one considers that early twentieth century uneasiness with
official executions and a desire to individualize punishment led most
states to abandon mandatory death penalties. States reacted by in-
stituting alternate sanctions and establishing degrees of offenses to
avoid imposing the death penalty. The irony is compounded because
states ultimately sought to avoid arbitrary use of the death penalty
by making it a discretionary sanction to be controlled by either the
judge or jury in a particular case. The Furman majority labeled this
humanitarian effort by the states "a haphazard process" while simul-
taneously hinting that a mandatory death penalty for certain offenses
might be the only means to prevent discrimination in the sentencing
of capital offenders. If a mandatory death penalty is enacted by Con-
gress or state legislatures for certain offenses, we will have come full
circle in the disposition of capital offenders in less than seventy-five
years. However, it is unlikely that a mandatory death penalty will be
introduced on any wide scale because such an approach is inflexible-
a vestige of nineteenth century sentencing philosophy rather than a
progressive policy commensurate with an enlightened approach to
capital punishment.
Justice Douglas concentrated his attack on the death penalty by
noting that society refuses to apply this sanction uniformly. Applica-
tion inevitably focuses on the poor, minority group members, and
other outcasts of society whose relatively small numbers allow them
1973]
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no countervailing political clout. Further, their poverty makes it
nearly impossible to obtain first-rate legal counsel, probably the most
crucial factor in the disposition of the convicted offender.5 3 Finally,
Justice Douglas found these capital punishment statutes unconstitu-
tional as violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments because
of the unlimited discretion of the juries and judges charged with
imposing sanctions on the convicted offenders. "Under these laws no
standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die,
dependent on the whim of one man or of 12."54
Justice Brennan noted that the motive of the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause was to head off any cruelty that the legislature
might promulgate into law. "Accordingly, the responsibility lies with
the courts to make certain that the prohibition of the clause is
enforced."55 It is conceded that legislatures have the constitutional
right and power to prescribe punishments for crimes-but not where
the legislative punishment violates the Bill of Rights. He proposes
four principles to assess whether a punishment is cruel and unusual:
(1) "a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the
dignity of human beings,"56 (2) ". . . the state must not arbitrarily
inflict a severe punishment,"57 (3) ". . . a severe punishment must
not be unacceptable to contemporary society,"58 and (4) "... a severe
punishment must not be excessive."59
In discussing the above principles Justice Brennan notes that death
causes the individual to lose the right to have rights, and its irrevocable
nature makes it uniquely degrading to human dignity. Regarding the
second principle he states;
When a country of over 200 million people inflict an unusually
severe punishment no more than 50 times a year, the inference is
strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly ap-
plied.60
Applying principle three, he asserts that moral debate has caused a
progressive decline in the infliction of death. Rather than exerting a
53 See The Courier-Journal & Times (Louisville), August 13, 1972, § E, at 5.
Don Reid, editor of the Hountsville Texas Item, notes that of the 189 executed men
whom he knew, only three or four had enough money to hire a good lawyer. The
process of discovering new evidence can go on indefinitely, however, the money
supply cannot. Mr. Reid is hopeful that the Supreme Court's decision in Furman
v. Georgia will stand after having personally viewed all 189 of these Texas
executions.54 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972).
55 Id. at 267.
56 Id. at 271.
57 Id. at 274.
58 Id. at 277.
59 Id. at 279.
6o Id. at 293.
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moralizing influence upon community values, death lowers our respect
for life and brutalizes our values. Finally, Justice Brennan finds
statistical data inconclusive to establish that death is a greater deter-
rent than imprisonment or that the overall objective of punishment,
including protection of society, is served more effectively by death
than imprisonment. Death is characterized as unjustifiable retribution
when an offender can be adequately neutralized by incarceration.
"Obviously, concepts of justice change; no immutable moral order
requires death for murderers and rapists."6 '
Concluding that the death penalty per se violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments, Justice Brennan would hold it impermissible
regardless of any possible legislative reform including the enactment
of mandatory death penalty statutes.
In sum, the punishment of death is inconsistent with all four prin-
ciples: death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment;
there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its re-
jection by contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no
reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively
than the less severe punishment of imprisonment. The function of
these principles is to enable a court to determine whether a pun-
ishment comports with human dignity. Death, quite simply, does
not.6 2
Justice Stewart based his opinion in Furman on the fact that
petitioners were among "a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."63 Although
he did not say that imposition of the death penalty is impermissible in
all circumstances, he concluded that the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments are violated when this unique sanction is imposed "so wantonly
and so freakishly."
64
Justice White's opinion focuses on the deterrent effect of the death
penalty given its infrequent imposition. The threat of execution to an
individual contemplating the commission of a capital offense has
become attenuated.
[T]he policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily in juries-a
decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of
the law and to bring community judgment to bear on the sentence
as well as guilt or innocence-has so effectively achieved its aims
that capital punishment within the confines of the statutes now
before us has for all practical purposes run its course.65
61 Id. at 304.
62 Id. at 305.
63 Id. at 309-10.
64 Id. at 310.
65 Id. at 313.
1978]
KENTucxY LAw JouRNAL
Justice Marshall alone concurs with Justice Brennan that the death
penalty is unconstitutional under all circumstances. After an examina-
tion of statistics prepared by Thorsten Sellin, an international authority
on capital punishment, Justice Marshall found the death penalty
excessive and unnecessary punishment violative of the eighth amend-
ment. He advocates a strong role for judges as "arbiters of the Con-
stitution" and concludes the legislatures have not demonstrated any
rational basis for their decisions that capital punishment serves as a
more effective sanction than life imprisonment. The question of
capital punishment's moral acceptability is treated intelligently by
Justice Marshall. He notes that the accuracy of any evaluation de-
pends upon whether people were fully informed of the penalty's
purposes and liabilities. With this as his criterion, he concludes that
the death penalty would be found "shocking, unjust, and unacceptable"
by an informed citizenry.
66
Justice Marshall points out that blacks as a class have been the
target for discriminatory application of the death penalty far in excess
of their proportion as a percentage of the population. 67 "Evaluations
of social worth naturally affect evaluations of individual culpability
and capacity for reform."6 8 Young and poor men whose lives were
spent in the shadows of parental and social neglect are the ones who
have been executed over the years. It is also pointed out that "only
32 women have been executed since 1930, while 3,827 men have met
a similar fate."69 An analysis of the death sentence for this period
indicates:
Whether a man died for his offense depended, not on the gravity of
his crime, not on the number of such crimes or the number of his
victims, not on his present or prospective danger to society, but on
such adventitious factors as the jurisdiction in which the crime
was committed, the color of his skin, his financial position, whether
he was male or female (we seldom execute females), and indeed
oftentimes on what were the character and characteristics of his
victim.
70
66 See id. at 361 n.145 where Justice Marshall terms it imperative for con-
stitutional purposes to learn the opinion of an informed electorate.
67 Sellin, The Negro Criminal, Tim AwNAis (Nov. 1928).
68 Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83
H.Av. L. REv. 1773, 1793 (1969-70). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969). In this case Alabama imposed the death penalty on a Negro for simple
robbery and the Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds. However, in
reversing, the court did not mention that an economic crime simply does not merit
death; obviously the sanction was not in proportion to the crime.6 9
NATIONAL PRIsoNER STATIsTIcs No. 45, CGAPrrAL PUNmISmENT 1930-1968,
at 28 (Aug. 1969).70 MacNamara, Statement Against Capital Punishment, in T. DFAH P.N-
ALTY IN AMCA 188 (H.A. Bedan ed. 1967). For a vivid example of how these
(Continued on next page)
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This portrays the inhuman side of capital punishment in America
as seen by the court majority in Furman.
The minority opinions written by the four dissenting justices ap-
pointed since 1968 by President Nixon argue that the state is justified
in taking the life of one of its citizens for certain criminal offenses
after a trial and conviction. Common to the opinions of Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist is the idea that
abolition of execution is a legislative function rather than a judicial
task.7 1 Their advocacy of judicial self-restraint is influenced by what
they consider to be the greater fact-finding expertise of the legislature
when it comes to the questions of administering the death penalty and
its psychological effects upon those awaiting execution.
Chief Justice Burger's interpretation of the eighth amendments
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause would not prohibit punishment
by death as long as the states prove it to be necessary for the deterrence
or control of crime. Rather than adopting the Furman majority's
interpretation that jury discretion in sentencing criminal offenders is a
"haphazard process," he quotes from Witherspoon which characterized
the jury system as an "articulate expression of the community con-
science on life and death."7 2 Chief Justice Burger denies that the
system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce
even-handed justice. He considers it an element of "fortuity" that some
people are sentenced to death while others committing the same offense
in another jurisdiction or tried before another jury escape that sanction.
Finally, he hints that legislatures may comply with Furman by estab-
lishing standards for judges and juries to follow in determining the
sentence in capital crimes or by narrowing the number of crimes
that would carry a mandatory death penalty.
Justice Blackmun notes:
Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for the
policy reasons argued by counsel for the respective petitioners and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
factors operate, see Bob Dylan's ballad entitled "The Lonesome Death of Hattie
Carroll" which appears on his album "The Times Are A-Changing." The ballad
tells of the cold-blooded murder of a black woman who, while cleaning up a
restaurant table, spilled a drink on a very wealthy Maryland landowner. The
incident took place in a downtown Baltimore Hotel as an entire room of patrons
were dining. Mr. William Zanzinger, the defendant, beat Hattie Carroll to death
with his cane and received a six month sentence-which was never even fully servedl
7' See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 69, at 1798, 1806. The authors hint
that the Supreme Court's avoidance of a decision such as that ultimately rendered
in Furman is based upon the peculiar institutional position of the Court. However,
it is also their contention that the legislative and executive branches of government
are not absolved of responsibility to guard constitutional rights when the Supreme
Court has declined to require them to do so. Instead, they have an even greater
burden to interpret and apply the constitution.
72 Witherspoon v. Illiuois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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expressed and adopted in the several opinions filed by the Justices
who vote to reverse these convictions.
73
His refusal to join the majority holding stems from a feeling that the
Court's action is sudden and disregards the principle of stare decisis,
particularly in regard to the recent holding in McGautha v. Cali-
fornia.74 McGautha held that there was no mandate in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment that juries be given instructions
as to when the death penalty should be imposed, the Court con-
cluding that judicially articulated standards were not needed to
ensure a responsible decision as to penalty. McGautha credits juries
with "due regard for the consequences of their decision."75 Justice
Blackmun indicates that the California Supreme Court's judicial nul-
lification of the death penalty76 is primarily responsible for the forced
decision in Furman. He concludes, "I fear the Court has overstepped.
It has sought and has achieved an end."77
Justice Powelrs opinion accepts the notion that constitutional
concepts are dynamic and such flexibility is the hallmark of our
democratic govermnent. However, he opposes total abolition of capital
punishment by judicial fiat especially when such action is based upon
individual Justices reading their personal preferences into the Con-
stitution. Recognizing that in the past there may have been dis-
criminatory application of the death penalty by the states upon blacks
convicted of raping white women, Justice Powell concludes this is
not proper grounds for invalidating present sentencing procedures.1
He does not want the Supreme Court to take an active role in reforming
criminal punishments and insists that legislation should only be struck
down in extraordinary cases.
Justice Rehnquist criticizes the Furman majority for striking down
the death penalty because it offends their sense of morality. He indi-
cates that the judgment of the legislative branches, both state and
federal, is more responsive to the popular will than the judicial
branch.7 9 He concludes that "this decision holding unconstitutional
capital punishment is not an act of judgment, but rather an act of
will."80
7 3 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 406 (1972).
74 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
75 Id. at 208.
76 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).77 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 288, 414 (1972).
78 But see Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 69, at 1794. The authors state
that if the choice is between imperfect administration of capital punishment and
abolition of capital punishment, constitutional values are heavily weighted in favor
of the latter.
79 See The Courier-Journal (Louisville), June 30, 1972, § A, at 24.8 0 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 468 (1972).
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The immediate question upon reading Furman is what are the
ramifications of this holding and how will the states and federal gov-
ernment react to this dramatic change in the criminal justice system.
Apparently the Supreme Court's declaration that present capital pun-
ishment statutes are unconstitutional means that over 600 convicted
offenders throughout the country have an unconditional reprieve from
death. Even if future capital punishment statutes are enacted and
held constitutional, they cannot be applied retroactively to these indi-
viduals. One must speculate that a period of uncertainty will follow
before the future of capital punishment in the United States will be
finally decided; however, reading the nine opinions indicates that
death might not be considered too harsh a penalty for some crimes if
it were administered to all persons found guilty of those crimes.
When the Supreme Court decided Furman there were 24 con-
demned prisoners on death row in Kentucky's Eddyville penitentiary.
Apparently none of the 24 will ever be executed. The circuit court
which tried the prisoner may hold a new trial for the sole purpose of
resentencing or the Governor may commute the death sentences to life
imprisonment. Finally, these men have the option of individually
petitioning the Supreme Court to be included under the Furman
mandate. The immediate result for those on death row at Eddyville
is "new and better quarters, farther removed from the prison's electric
chair, and privileges almost equal to those of other inmates."8'
Kentucky Attorney General Edward Hancock's immediate reaction
to the Supreme Court's holding was that "the death penalty can neither
be carried out in cases already settled, nor demanded by prosecutors
under present circumstances." 2 He hoped that the Kentucky Court
of Appeals would clarify the application of the decision and institute
guidelines to be followed in Kentucky. Realizing that until the law is
amended the death penalty is defunct, the Attorney General requested
that Governor Ford convene a special session of the legislature to
consider the problem.
To determine whether the basic assumptions underlying Furman
can be substantiated by the Kentucky experience we need to examine
the statistics relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Since
Kentucky installed its electric chair at Eddyville in 1911, 79 whites
and 83 blacks have been executed. Since 1930 all seven men executed
for rape have been black. The educational background of the 99
persons electrocuted since 1930 reveals:
Fourteen were illiterates;
81 See The Courier-Journal (Louisville), July 17, 1972, § A, at 11.82 See The Courier-Journal (Louisville), July 21, 1972, § A, at 9.
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Twenty-five never went beyond the Fourth Grade;
Thirty-seven did not complete the Eighth Grade;
Sixteen attended high school, but didn't graduate;
Only seven were high school graduates and none had attended
college.8 3
Obviously, during the past 43 years a capital offender had a far better
chance to be sentenced to death in Kentucky if poor, black and un-
educated.
4
The Kentucky experience also illustrates that hardened criminals
with long histories of criminal conduct are not the ones most fre-
quently executed. A profile of the ninety-nine offenders executed
during this period portrays the following facts:
Fifty-six of the 99 had no record of a previous criminal conviction;
Twenty-two had one previous conviction;
Only 21 of those killed by the state had been convicted of two or
more criminal offenses;
Four of those executed were under 18 years of age, and 18 were
under 21 years of age;
Forty-two more were under 30 years of age;
The youngest person executed was 16 years of age, and this oc-
curred in March 1946.85
An analysis of the 24 men facing execution at the time the Supreme
Court decided Furman reveals 10 blacks and 14 whites with average
ages of 23i2 years and 292 years respectively at the time they committed
their offenses.86 The criminal offenses for which the blacks were con-
victed ranged from willful murder in the course of armed robbery to
willful murder of an on-duty policemen. The average age of blacks con-
victed of killing on-duty policemen was 20 years with all of these crimes
being committed in the populous and industrialized Louisville metro-
politan area. All of the blacks were from very poor families and
83 Mills, Society Has No Moral Right..., The Courier-Journal (Louisville),
July 23, 1972, § E, at 3.84 Yet% the more frequent imposition of the death penalty for criminal offenders
characterized as poor, black, and uneducated has been partially explained by the
composition of the jury-if te jur belongs to the dominant or "in group", and the
defendant and his witnesses belong to an "out group"-as they frequently do-the
defendant's evidence is often discounted to zero. Ehrmann, The Death Penalty and
the Administration of Justice, in THE DEATH PENALTY iN AmmCA 421-22 (H. A.
Bedau ed. 1967).
85 Mills, Society Has No Moral Right ... , The Courier-Journal (Louisville),
July 23, 1972, § E, at 3.86 .The author would like to thank Superintendent Henry E. Cowan of the
Kentucky State Penitentiary at Eddyville who furnished some of this data about
the men on "death row" and several recent University of Kentucky College of Law
graduates who provided information on some of the 24 men, including the nature
of crimes and victims.
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demonstrated a lack of education.87 The criminal offenses for which
the whites were convicted ranged from rape of a girl over 12 to
willful murder in the course of an armed robbery. The only policeman
killed by whites was attempting to thwart an escape by four men
after an armed robbery. The average age of these four whites was
323- years.
The most striking aspect of many of these savage crimes is the
senselessness of the killing, which often occurred in the course of
committing lesser crimes such as petty robberies. These men seem to
have been acting impulsively, their crimes generally not dictated by
economic need. "They will act psychopathically. Their tendencies
and acts will be anti-social, egotistic, disruptive, and outright crim-
inal." 8
On November 17, 1972, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided
the first case involving a defendant who had been sentenced to death
prior to the Furman decision. The Court upheld the murder conviction
of Warren Caldwell; however, it suspended the death penalty imposed
by the Christian County Circuit Court. They remanded the case to
the lower court for the purpose of reducing Caldwell's sentence to life
imprisonment, citing Furman as declaring the death penalty uncon-
stitutional as presently imposed.89
On March 15, 1973, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, speaking
through Chief Justice John S. Palmore, formally announced the in-
validation of the Commonwealth's death penalty and required modi-
fication of the sentences of the remaining 23 men on death row. The
Court said these men should be sentenced to the "next highest penalty
the law sets for the crime."90 The judges of the circuit courts will
87These blacks in a ghetto environment suffer from residential and general
cultural isolation from the community. They become part of a subculture of
violence where participation in criminal homicide is common. See Wolfang, A
Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide, in THE DEAT PENALTY IN AMEUICA
79 (H.A. Bedau ed. 1967).88 Batt, The New Outlaw: A Psychological Footnote to the Criminal Law, 52
Ky. L.J. 497, 498 (1964). The author's thesis is that the ever increasing crimes of
violence are linked to widespread psychopathy in our complex society especially
among people under 25 years of age. The psychopathic offender may commit 25
to 100 criminal offenses varying in degree of severity in a lifetime. His aberrant
behavior is based upon a defective super-ego which fails to internalize society's
moral codes. Psychopaths hate authority; people in authority are persons to exploit
and manipulate without remorse. Professor Batt explains the vulnerability of blacks
to the above conditions by noting their lack of personality development based upon
the instability of family relationships.
89 TeCourier-journal (Louisville), November 18, 1972, § B, at 1. But see
Weber v. Commonwealth, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Ky. 1946), where the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that judicial invalidation was reserved only for a punish-
ment 'so proportioned to the offense committed that it shocks the moral sense of
all reasonable men."
9)0 See The Courier-Journal (Louisville), March 16, 1973, § A, at 1.
1973]
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
modify the sentences by order, thereby avoiding costly resentencing
procedures. In theory, these men are eligible for a parole hearing
after serving six years. Three formerly condemned prisoners have
already served this six year period.
Mrs. Lucile Robuck, chairman of the state's Parole Board, antici-
pating public outcry at the possibility that men who faced the electric
chair for murder might now be freed, stressed that "being eligible for
parole is not at all the same as actually being paroled."91 Mrs. Robuck
explained that the men will receive parole hearings but emphasized
that when the Board deals with someone who has taken a life,
decisions to grant parole are made very carefully. Psychiatric eval-
uations of each man will be studied to determine whether he has
reached the point where he can be safely released into society. Some
are psychotic and therefore will never be released; others may be
eventually paroled under strict conditions and the watchful super-
vision of a parole officer.
An analysis of the crimes for which the majority of the 24 pre-
viously condemned men stand convicted might prompt the Kentucky
General Assembly to consider enacting mandatory death penalty
statutes for the murder of policemen 92 or for the commission of a
murder in the course of another felony. It seems likely that the
present Supreme Court will uphold such enactments providing capital
punishment is applied automatically to all those convicted of the
particular offense. In some respects this does not seem too harsh for
heinous crimes. However, such a course cannot benefit our society.
Institutionalized violence in the form of legal killing is self-indulgent,
self-destructive, and incompatible with the vast progress of this
century. The perpetration of violence on fellow human beings, far
too common and almost casually accepted, is not inevitable in a
civilized society.
In light of the Furman holding precluding the death sentence, life
imprisonment without privilege of parole should be adopted for the
most serious offenders whose past criminal records indicate a definite
trend of psychopathic behavior. This sentence implies that the offender
cannot be rehabilitated and permanent incarceration is necessary to
protect society. The enactment of such a sanction would eliminate
91 See The Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 2, 1973, § A, at 1.
92 Sellin, Capital Punishment, 8 Cmnm. L.Q. 36, 46-49 (1965-1966). The
author demonstrates that policemen are no safer in jurisdictions where the death
penalty exists as a sanction for their murder than in jurisdictions where no death
penalty exists. Furthermore, Sellin undercuts the often stated argument that life
sentences for murderers risk homicides in jails. He notes that murders in prison
are committed by persons serving life sentences for crimes such as robbery and
forgery rather than for murder.
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the anomalous situation we are presently facing where all men serving
sentences of life imprisonment must be accorded parole hearings after
six years in the penitentiary.
Nationally, the Supreme Court's holding in Furman resulted in
vigorous efforts by many states to restore the death penalty. On No-
vember 2, 1972, the Delaware Supreme Court declared capital punish-
ment permissible for murder convictions since the death penalty was
mandatory there for certain crimes prior to Furman. On November 7,
1972, California voters passed a referendum reinstating the death
penalty in state prosecutions thereby overturning People v. Anderson.
93
The California referendum has the effect of a state constitutional
amendment. However, California voters can re-establish capital pun-
ishment only to the extent permitted under Furman. In other words,
the referendum vote could restore capital punishment only for those
crimes that carried a mandatory death penalty prior to Anderson9
4
or for crimes that the California legislature subsequently makes
mandatorily punishable by death. Further, this type of legislative
action seems to preclude judicial review because the referendum's
Proposition 17 states that capital punishment "shall not be deemed"
to violate any part of the California Constitution. This raises a
serious separation of powers question. In effect, Proposition 17 means
that Californians have overruled their state Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Bill of Rights and have attempted to limit judicial
review of future legislative action. The role of the judiciary as arbiters
of the Constitution could be severely undercut by such legislative
action.
The Attorneys General of several states are drafting proposals rang-
ing from a United States Constitutional amendment to model laws
with mandatory capital punishment for specific offenses. "Of the 35
states with functioning death penalty statutes, courts in at least 17
states have thus far ruled that the Supreme Court's decision in Furman
is controlling." 5 However, a strong campaign to restore capital punish-
ment is expected in at least 10 states. For example, on December 1,
1972, the Florida State Legislature passed legislation giving judges
the option of imposing the death sentence for certain crimes but laid
down very specific guidelines requiring aggravating circumstances to
justify its imposition. The Supreme Court has yet to review any of
the new state legislation relating to capital punishment.
03 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
94 These four rather obscure crimes are iling a prison guard, train wrecking,
treason against California, and perjury leading to execution of an innocent person.
95 Tnm, November 20, 1972. at 74.
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The Nixon administration on January 4, 1973 announced that "Con-
gress will be asked to enact a mandatory death penalty for several
categories of cold-blooded, premeditated federal crimes."9" Attorney
General Kleindienst indicated that the death penalty would be sought
for "kidnapping, assassination of a public official, sky-jacking, killing
a prison guard, or bombing a public building."9 7 However, this pro-
posal has drawn criticism and an alternate bill has been introduced in
Congress by Senator McClellan of Arkansas. The McClellan bill, the
result of years of study and legislative hearings, calls for the death
penalty only where a defendant in the course of a serious criminal act
intentionally takes another's life. It also includes a provision for
bifurcated trials with one proceeding to decide the issue of guilt
followed by a separate proceeding to determine punishment if the
offender is found guilty. The McClellan bill is the more realistic
proposal and seems more likely to pass than the administration's
proposal.
While the ultimate solution for the disposition of serious criminal
offenders has yet to be reached, the states and federal government
must be realistic in their interpretation of Furman. Attorneys General,
legislators, and law enforcement officials must be willing to take
Camus's "civilizing step," the abolition of the death penalty. Although
the Supreme Court did not prohibit capital punishment under all cir-
cumstances, the thrust of their holding represents its death knell in
view of the belief that the mandatory death penalty is inflexible and
undercuts the role of the jury in our criminal justice system. Chief
Justice Burger states in Furman, "... . mandatory sentences of death,
without the intervening and ameliorating impact of lay jurors, may
be so arbitrary and doctrinaire that they violate the Constitution."9
Most importantly, reintroduction of the mandatory death penalty
would represent a step backward in the slow progress of penal reform.
III. P sisTENT FELoNY OFDFEN Rs
The persistent felony offender may be characterized generally as
an individual repeatedly in trouble with the law, associating mainly
with other criminals, spending a large part of his life in prison, and
living from the proceeds of crime. Many are psychologically disturbed
and highly dangerous. Increasingly bitter after each confrontation
with the criminal justice system, habitual offenders develop more
sophisticated notions of criminality during incarceration as a result
96The Courier-Journal (Louisville), January 5, 1973, § A, at 1.
97 Id.98 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972).
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of exposure to other hard core criminals. When dealing with per-
sistent felony offenders, two basic problems emerge: the duration of
imprisonment and the type of individual to whom the extended term
should be applied. The primary legal task involves distinguishing
dangerous from less serious offenders.
A. Habitual Criminal Statutes-A Backward Glance
Most states have habitual criminals statutes. However, according
to Wechsler, "[tihe consensus is that habitual criminals statutes are a
failure, productive of chaotic and unjust results when they are used,
and greatly nullified in practice." 99 Operating to sweep up persistent
social nuisances while more dangerous and serious offenders remain
free, these statutes are most often invoked against narcotic addicts,
prostitutes, alcoholics, vagrants, petty offenders, and some professional
criminals. Even sexual psychopath laws which exist in most juris-
dictions fail to distinguish the dangerous and brutal offenders from
those who are merely inadequate and aberrant. The contribution of
these laws to the problem of controlling dangerous criminal offenders
is minimal.100 Wechsler points out four defects generally found in
habitual offender laws:
• ... first, they are mandatory wholly or in part in over half the
jurisdictions; second, the extensions often are too long or appear
arbitrary in their length, especially when they import long minima
or otherwise exclude parole; third, the extension especially when
it involves life sentences, takes inadequate account of the gravity
of the offense of last conviction for which the sentence is imposed;
fourth, the extension rests entirely upon prior record and takes no
account of other types of special danger that particular offenders
may represent.' 0 '
The inadequacy of the law dealing with habitual offenders may
be partially explained. Where discretion in imposing sentence or
granting parole exists, the judge or parole board will consider the
potential danger to the community in deciding whether to release
the offender. Some consider this an adequate safeguard. However,
many who repeatedly commit crimes of violence and consequently
represent a real threat to society manage to escape the imposition of life
imprisonment and must eventually be released.
Over a decade ago, a movement to establish a more precise defini-
tion of "dangerous" offenders resulted in a variety of recommendations
09 Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L.
RE:. 465, 483 (1961).
100 Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CGlM.
L.C. & P.S. 215, 226 (1960).
101 See Wechsler, supra note 99, at 483.
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including those of the Advisory Council of Judges of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency and the American Law Institute.
The Advisory Council's Model Sentencing Act defines "dangerous
offenders" as those who have committed or attempted certain crimes
of physical violence and who are found by the court to be "suffering
from a severe personality disorder indicating a propensity toward
criminal activity."1 02 The Act provides that "dangerous offenders" may
be sentenced to 80 years imprisonment and recommends, but does not
require, psychiatric substantiation of the defendant's criminal pro-
pensities. Under the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code a
convicted felon could have his term of imprisonment extended beyond
the maximum provided for that category of felony when "the defendant
is a dangerous, mentally abnormal person whose commitment for an
extended term is justifiable for protection of the public." 10 3 As a
prerequisite to judicial imposition of the extended sentence there must
be a psychiatric examination
[r]esulting in the conclusion that his mental condition is gravely
abnormal; that his criminal conduct has been characterized by a
pattern of repetitive or compulsive behavior or by persistent aggres-
sive behavior with heedless indifference to consequences; and that
such condition makes him a serious danger to others. 1'4
Both approaches require a prediction as to the course of one's future
criminality. The subsequent uncertainty made sentencing a guessing
game for judges dealing with potential persistent felony offenders as
they sought to protect society without inflicting needless injustice on
criminals in the form of extended sentences.
These recommendations reflect a sincere effort to articulate alterna-
tives to conventional persistent offender statutes. However, they have
failed to mobilize the psychiatric resources necessary to recognize and
treat psychologically disturbed and potentially dangerous offenders.
The criminal justice system with its emphasis on imprisonment for
offenders perpetuates the habitual offender as a behavioral phenomenon,
for the total experience produces an individual committed to criminal
values. We desperately need to develop viable alternatives to im-
prisonment for dealing with the habitual offender.
B. Kentucky Pre-Code Habitual Offender Law
Prior to the enactment of the Kentucky Penal Code, this state's
habitual offender statute fit the defective mold described by Wechsler.
10
2
A~visony CoUNcIL OF JuDGEs OF THE NATIONAL CouNciL ON CmrE AND
DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING AcT §§ 5(a), 5(b) (1963).
103 MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03(3) (Prop. Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
104 Id.
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Persons previously convicted of two or more felonies were auto-
matically given life imprisonment. 0 5 Rarely were they given psy-
chiatric examinations to determine the propriety of the sentence.
0 6
The law operated mechanically and often unfairly due to a complete
lack of distinction between types of criminal acts. An individual who
was convicted of three felonies, regardless of whether they involved
violence or resulted in injury to others, was automatically sentenced
to life imprisonment. 07 For this reason alone the statute seeems un-
justifiable and could probably have been challenged on constitutional
grounds. Isolation and deterrence are valid penal objectives; how-
ever, statutory language imposing an automatic life sentence on thrice-
convicted felons violates prevailing principles of excessiveness and
proportionality.
C. Persistent Felony Offenders Under the Kentucky Penal Code
Influenced by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and
the penal codes of New York and Michigan, Kentucky adopted an
approach to persistent felony offenders' 08 consistent with the Code's
classification of crimes approach. 0 9 Mindful of the need to protect
from habitual criminals, the General Assembly nevertheless recognized
that not all deserved the same sanction.
The Kentucky Penal Code does not provide for extended terms of
imprisonment for an individual convicted of a Class "A" felony
because adequate sentencing alternatives exist without regard to the
offender's past criminal record." l0 However, the legislature recognized
a need for extended terms applicable to habitual felons convicted of a
Class "B," "C" or "D" felony. Class "B" felons are most likely to pose a
serious threat to the public, since they include those convicted of
crimes involving violence to persons and often have a high degree of
recidivism.
105 KRS § 431.190. Any person convicted a second time of a felony
shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than double the time of the
sentence under the first conviction; if convicted a third time of a felony,
be shall be confined in the penitentiary during his life. Judgment in such
cases shall not be given for the increased penalty unless the jury finds,
from the record and other competent evidence, former convictions for
felonies committed by the prisoner, in or out of this state.
100 KBS § 210.360. The Kentucky Commissioner of Mental Health causes
the p'erson to be examined by a department psychiatrist to determine his mental
condition and the existence of any mental disease or defect which would affect his
criminal responsibility. Yet, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Etherton v. Com-
monwealth, 379 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1964), held that such mental examination is not
a condition precedent to subjecting someone to trial under the habitual criminal
statute nor will the failure to perform such an examination void the conviction.
107 See Wingo v. Ringo, 408 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1966).
108 KYPC § 267 [KRS § 435A.1-0801.
109 KYPC § 265 [KRS § 435A.1-060].
"0 KYPC § 2 65(2) (a) [KRS § 435A.1-060(2) (a)].
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Section 3445 of the Proposed Kentucky Penal Code as presented
to the General Assembly provided that when a persistent felony
offender charge is brought, the jury acts in a bifurcated proceeding to
determine whether the accused is guilty of the felony charge. If
found guilty, the jury fixes sentence for that offense."' The same
jury then considers whether the accused qualifies as a persistent
offender. An affirmative verdict requires a unanimous vote."12 If this
occurs, the extended term replaces the ordinary sentence fixed by the
prior jury deliberation. This procedure was designed to afford full
protection to the accused on the issue of guilt or innocence, yet provide
leeway in the penalty stage for consideration of all information
relevant to sentencing. This bifurcated proceeding resolves the con-
flict between the need to introduce proof of prior convictions and the
evidentiary safeguard that an accused should not be convicted of an
alleged present crime merely because of past criminal conduct.
However, when § 3445 was enacted, the General Assembly eliminated
the language in subsection (1) providing for a bifurcated proceeding.
This effectively destroys the contemplated scheme and it is urged
that the legislature reconsider its action and enact the proposed
section in its entirety.
Perhaps the most important feature of the section dealing with
persistent offenders concerns the requirements which must be satisfied
before an individual can be convicted. The Code requires the per-
sistent felony offender (1) to be more than twenty-one years of age,
(2) to stand presently convicted of a felony, and (8) to have been
previously convicted of at least two felonies."13 The previous felony
convictions may have taken place in Kentucky or in another juris-
diction so long as the defendant was over eighteen years of age at
the time the first offense was committed, a sentence of at least one
year of imprisonment was imposed for each felony, and the defendant
was imprisoned under sentence for both convictions prior to commis-
sion of the present felony.1 4
Because protection of society through incarceration of the danger-
ous individual rather than rehabilitation of the offender is the objective,
care must be taken to avoid a classification of an individual as an
habitual offender."" 5 The strict age limitations are necessary "to
M11 KYPC § 265 [KRS § 435A.1-060].
312 LRC § 3445(1). Yet, if the jury is unable to agree unanimously that the
defendant is a persistent felony offender or on the sanction to be imposed upon him,
the original sentence fixed by the jury under LRC § 3440 shall stand.
1l3 KYPC§ 267(2) [KRS § 435A.1-080].
"4 KYPC § 267 (2)(a),(b),(c) [KRS § 435A.1-080 (2)(a),(b),(c)].
15 LRC § 3445, Commentary.
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restrict application of the extended terms of imprisonment to indi-
viduals who have achieved relative maturity."" 6
The requirement that at least one year of imprisonment was
served for both prior felonies enables the Commonwealth to use con-
victions from another state for the purpose of this statute. This is true
even where the other state labeled the particular offense a misde-
meanor rather than a felony. For example, if a man were convicted
of an offense in Indiana for which he served one year, it could sub-
sequently be used in the compilation of the three felonies required
for sentencing as a persistent felony offender in Kentucky. By requir-
ing the defendant to have been imprisoned for the previous offenses
prior to treating him as a habitual offender, exposure to a rehabilitative
effort during the prior institutionalization will be assured. The Ken-
tucky Penal Code further specifies that
in determining whether a person has two or more previous felony
convictions, two or more convictions of crime for which that person
served concurrent or uninterrupted consecutive terms of imprison-
ment shall be deemed to be only one conviction, unless one of the
convictions was for an offense committed while the person was
imprisoned." 7
The exception whereby an individual would be charged with two
convictions if one of his offenses took place in prison is necessary to
deter the commission of crimes while offenders are incarcerated. The
general impact of this provision represents an effort to defer labeling
an individual a persistent offender if rehabilitation is possible during
an ordinary term of imprisonment.
Section 267118 of the Penal Code operates in the following manner
to assess the time to be served in an extended term by the persistent
felony offender. If the defendant's most recent offense was a Class "B"
felony, the jury is limited to consideration of an indeterminate term
with a maximum sentence of from twenty years to life. In other words,
the persistent felon is treated exactly as a Class "A" felon convicted of
committing a single Class "A" offense under the general classification
scheme of the Code.119 Those individuals categorized as persistent
offenders whose most recent offense was a Class "C" or "D" felony
may be sentenced to extended terms"20 double the ordinary term
provided for the conviction of a single Class "C" felony.121 "This ap-
116 Id.
17 KYPC § 267(3) [KRS § 435A.1-080(3)].
118 [KRS § 435A.1-080].
1i9 KYPC § 260 [KRS § 435A.1-010].
120 KYPC § 267(4) (b) [KRS § 435A.1-080(4) (b)].
121 KYPC § 265(2) (c) [KRS § 435A.1-060(2) (c)].
1973]
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proach to the question of duration of the term imprisonment for a
habitual criminal is consistent with the approach proposed in the
Model Penal Code."12
2
The extended term provision of the Kentucky Penal Code is a
more flexible and reasonable legislative pronouncement than that
represented by the old statute.123 No longer is it possible for an of-
fender to receive an extended term of imprisonment after only two
felony convictions. The requirement that one be adjudged an habitual
offender only after committing three felonies goes a long way toward
establishing the felon's incapacity for rehabilitation through normal
terms of imprisonment.
D. Concurrent and Consecutive Terms of Imprisonment
Section 270124 of the Kentucky Penal Code was enacted to augment
Section 267.125 The section deals with the length of the term which
may be imposed on a defendant and how these terms are to be served.
Even with the imposition of consecutive indeterminate terms, the
maximum term which can be accumulated by a defendant can be no
greater than the maximum term that can be imposed on a persistent
felony offender. 26
Anyone who commits an offense while on parole is treated the
same as the offender who commits an offense while in prison. His
second sentence may have to be served consecutively rather than
concurrently if the court chooses to exercise its discretion.127 The Code
also removes all restrictions from the trial court's imposition of con-
secutive sentences on one who commits an offense while in prison,
pending imprisonment, or during an escape from custody.2 8 The
major thrust of this Code provision reverses the prior principle that
sentences imposed would be construed to run consecutively, and
therefore unless the court specifies how a sentence is to run, it shall
run concurrently. 129 The rationale for such a change is based on the
fact that if a court does not feel strongly enough about the case to
specify the manner in which the sentences are to run, then such
sentences should run concurrently.
Marvin L. Coan
122 LRC § 3445, Commentary.
123 KRS § 431.190.
124 [KRS § 435A.1-110].
125 [KRS § 435A.1-080].
126KYPC § 270(1)(c) [KRS § 435A.1-110(1)(c)].
12 7LRC § 3460, Commentary.
128 KYPC § 270 [KRS § 435A.1-110].
129 See Beasley v. Wingo, 432 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1968).
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